MADAGASCAR AND MOZAMBIQUE IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY: THE ERA OF THE SAKALAVA RAIDS (1800-1820)

by

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Important historical links have existed between Madagascar and Mozambique for many centuries, but no single episode stands out more vividly than the Sakalava raids against the East African coast, which Deschamps has called «one of the most astonishingly daring exploits in Malgache history» (1). The two earliest scholarly reconstructions of the raids, both of which were published in 1845, drew upon a variety of French and British sources and have continued to exercise a major influence on subsequent interpretations, all of which have focused on them from a Malagasy or Comorien perspective (2). They have not, however, been able to utilize the contemporary Portuguese documentation which was generated primarily as a consequence of the devastating expeditions launched against the northern Mozambican coast in the second decade of the century, but also as a result of well established commercial connections with the Comoro Islands, Madagascar, and the Swahili coast to the north of Cape

Delgado (3). In this paper I shall look more carefully at the Sakalava raids from a coastal perspective by utilizing these sources in an attempt to establish more clearly when they occurred; the nature and extent of their impact on the coast; and, most importantly, what we can learn about their motivation, organization, and demise.

The earliest documented attack from Madagascar on East Africa occurred late in 1800 and has traditionally been attributed to the Sakalava (4). On closer inspection, however, the details are rather less precise. According to the Portuguese Governor of the Kerimba Islands:

On 29 November three boats of people from Sáo Lourenço Island arrived at Vamizi Island [the northernmost of the archipelago with a significant Portuguese population] with nearly sixty people to await the monsoon so that they could return to their land, having been put out of the lands of Tungui [immediately south of Cape Delgado] by the chief of that place, and finding themselves with nothing to eat and nothing with which to buy food, they went first to one of our settlements in that jurisdiction to frighten the inhabitants in order to rob food, whereupon seeing before long that our people were intimidated they were encouraged to continue on to two other settlements, where they burned the houses and seized some Negroes.

Absolutely no resistance was organized by the Portuguese commander at Vamizi, though he could call upon some two hundred men, which the Governor deemed especially miserable in view of the fact that the attacking party consisted of only twenty men, as «the others were dispersed fishing» (5).

Clearly, there is no mention of the Sakalava here and although a few captives were taken in these skirmishes one cannot confidently assert that the object of the men from Madagascar was to capture slaves. Those few Africans who were taken captive appear to have been an afterthought according to this source. The vague wording regarding their ouster from the Swahili community of Tungui also raises more questions than it provides answers. Perhaps these were not, after all, Sakalava? Certainly no particular notice was taken of their boats, which suggests to me that they were not sailing in lakandrafitra, the characteristic outrigger canoes of the Sakalava and Betsimisaraka raiders. Finally, to compound the uncertainty, there is a passing reference by the same Governor to the arrival at Ibo, the Portuguese administrative headquarters for the Kerim-
ba Islands, of the King of Mayotte with three boats and 150 armed men from Madagascar with whom he was intending to fight another «king» — presumably, but not clearly, one based on the African coast (6). Might not his quarrel have been with the Muslim ruler of Tungui and the three boats of pillagers around Vamizi the survivors of his ill-fated expedition? Further speculation is fruitless at this point, but the possibilities raised by this initial incident deserve bearing in mind as we turn next to the decade of conflict between the Portuguese, Swahili, and Sakalava.

Well before the first major Sakalava attack against the Portuguese possessions in the Kerimba Islands, the Portuguese had already come to know and fear them as a consequence of two humiliating encounters at sea. In the first, a Portuguese merchant vessel, the Boa Mãe, was sacked by «Sakalava, or Malgaches, Negroes from the north of the Island of Madagascar», in 1805 while standing at anchor in the harbour of Domoni, Anjouan Island. Thinking that they were friendly, the crew of the Boa Mãe did not prevent the ship from being encircled by some twenty-five canoes of about twenty or more men each. Once their true purpose was recognized resistance was offered, but in the ensuing combat almost the entire crew was killed (7). Determined to punish the Sakalava, on 19 January 1806 the Portuguese military schooner, Emboasada, sailed from Mozambique with a crew of seventy bound for Madagascar. After touching at Anjouan the Emboasada apparently proceeded on towards Cap d'Ambré, near where it was rendered helpless in a dead calm and surrounded by the Malagasy fleet. The entire crew was put to death and the ship

(6) A.H.U., Moç., Cx. 37, same to same, Ibo, 10 July 1800. If the leader of this expedition was indeed the Sultan of Mayotte, then he would have been Saleh bin Mohamed, a Zanzibar Arab who had married into the ruling family. See «Histoire de Mayotte et des Sakkalava depuis l'invasion de Radama dans le royaume de Bouéni, par le cheikh Iousouf ben el-Moallém-Moussa, de la grande Comore», collected by V. Noel in 1840 and translated from the Arabic in Noel, «Recherches sur les Sakkalava», Bulletin de la Société de Géographie, 2ème Série, XX (1843), pp. 41-55. Francisco Santana (éd.), Documentação do Arquivo Histórico Ultramarino, III (Lisbon, 1974), p. 241, unaccountably attributes this raid to the Sultan of Anjouan and also misdates it to 1801. For a much earlier incident involving a boat from Mohilla Island with seventy — two men, nearly half of whom were armed, which was part of a «squadron which was going to make war in Anjouan», but which was blown off course in a storm and arrived at Ibo, see A.H.U., Moç., Cx. 12, Caetano Alberto Judice to Governor-General, Ibo, 20 April 1766.

(7) A.H.U., Codice 1372, fl. 7v, Isidro Almeida Sousa e Sá to Visconde de Anadia, Moç., 9 July 1805, basing his report on an unlocated communication from the Sultan of Anjouan. Cf. the treatment by Guillard, Madagascar, p. 200 who misdates this event to 1807 and states that the Bonne-Mère (Boa Mãe) flew French colours and was captured by a man named Legars. The Portuguese Governor-General's letter explains that the vessel had been purchased by Vicente Guedes da Silva e Sousa from a Frenchman called Tessero (Tisserot ?) and specifically expressed his shock at «the insult that these barbarians made against the Portuguese flag». It would not be at all surprising, however, if the captain was still French, as this was common practice in the Mozambican slave trade of this period.
taken to port at Ancouala, where it was demolished in order to recover its hardware. No better index of Portuguese insecurity in Mozambique at this time exists than the fact they took seriously the rumour that during these maritime attacks the Sakalava «committed their usual barbarities (they say that they eat human flesh and drink salt water)» (8).

From September 1808 until 4 January 1809 a major force of Sakalava terrorized the entire Mozambican coast from Ushanga, just north of the Lurí River mouth, up to Tungui. Those Portuguese residents of the mainland who did not seek refuge in the stout fortress at Ibo fled into the interior, abandoning houses and plantations to the invaders. Hardest hit of the Portuguese settlements was Querimba Island, immediately south of Ibo Island, while a total of some 800 Persons, «including titled land owners, Moors, and slaves», were taken captive (9). The effects of this devastation were echoed cross the next few years by the inhabitants of the islands, who regularly sought relief from their impoverished condition in appeals to the Portuguese administration at Mozambique Island (10). Normal trading relations between the islands and Madagascar also yielded unexpected rewards during this period. Late in 1810 a mulatto woman from Querimba Island who had been captured by the Sakalava was ransomed by a Muslim Makua trader – the brother of Chief Mutuga, whose town was located at the mouth of the Tari River, just north of Pemba Bay, and was the center of Swahili trade at that time – who purchased her and several others at an unspecified Sakalava port while doing business at Bombetoka Bay. This particular woman was actually returned to Ibo by a Prince of Grand Comoro Island, who had come directly from Bombetoka and who also carried word from the Makua trader that there were other female captives from the islands in Sakalava country, including the prazo-holder of Vamizi Island, Caterina Pais de Morais, the granddaughter of the

(8) A.H.U., Cod. 1372, fl. 7v, Sousa e Sã to Anadia, Moç., 9 July 1805 ; fl. 11v-12, Francisco de Paula e Albuquerque Amaral Cardoso to same; Moç., 6 January 1806 ; & fl. 28v, Interim Governing Triumvirate to same, Moç., 10 October 1807 ; Guillain, Madagascar, p. 200. Since the Portuguese only learned of the Emboscada’s fate from a Portuguese ship’s captain who got his information from a Sakalava whom he encountered at Mauritius and who claimed to have been present at the attack, it is understandable that French sources might be more detailed on this point, though Guillain misdates the incident to 1805.

(9) A.H.U., Moç., Cx. 48, Interim Governing Triumvirate to Antonio Alberto Pereira, Moç., 20 September 1808, and same to Anadia, Moç., 10 November 1808 (also in A.H.U., Cod. 1372, fl. 32v-33) ; A.H.U., Moç., Cx. 54, Jerónimo Fernandes Viana to Interim Governing Triumvirate, Ibo, 16 February 1810.

(10) Ibid., petition of the inhabitants of the Cape Delgado Islands, 5 July 1810, enclosed in Francisco Antonio de Sousa Cesar to Antonio de Melo Castro e Mendonça, Ibo, 28 December 1810 ; A.H.U., Moç., Cx. 55, same to same, Ibo, 18 [April] 1811. See also, A.H.U., Moç., Cx. 56, José da Silva Delgado to same, Ibo, 15 July 1812, seeking a military post and citing previous service against the Sakalava at Pangani, on the mainland north of Ibo.
most powerful Portuguese settler on the entire mainland of northern Mozambique during the last quarter of the eighteenth century (11). Yet for all this disruption, the principal object of the Sakalava expedition of 1808-1809 was Tungui, against which they employed «all the hostilities that they could possibly carry out, penetrating a considerable distance into the hinterland».

But the Sakalava paid dearly for their time in East Africa and according to escaped prisoners such a large number died from smallpox that they had to abandon some lakas (the number of which is never given in the Portuguese documentation for this expedition) and burn others because they did not have enough men to sail them home (12).

For the next several years there were constant rumours reaching the Portuguese at Ibo of an impending attack against the Kerimba Islands by the Sakalava. In 1811 the Sultan of Anjouan warned of an attack on Mozambique, noting that the Sakalava had guides with them who knew Mozambique and the mainland well reporting that he had heard of French accompanying the Sakalava (13). A year later vague reports from Madagascar suggested renewed aggression and by 1814 reports from the Sultan of Anjouan and his

(11) A.H.U., Moç., Cx. 53, Sousa Cesar to same, Ibo, 28 December 1810; for what little we know about Jdão de Morais, see Alpers, Ivory and Slaves, pp. 146, 182, 190. Traditions regarding the ransoming of relatives who had been enslaved during these raids and taken away to Madagascar were current in some families on Grand Comoro Island four decades ago; see le Docteur Fontoyon & Raomandahy, médecin indigène, «La Grande Comore», Mémoires de l'Académie Malgache, XXIII (Tananarive, 1937), p. 17.

(12) A.H.U., Moç., Cx. 52, Pereira to Interim Governing Triumvirate, Ibo, 1 April 1809; Henry Salt, A Voyage to Abyssinia ... (London, 1814), p. 79. Guilain's account of the 1807 Sakalava expedition that encountered a French slaving vessel at sea, sacked it, and then was decimated by smallpox contracted from the African slaves on board appears to be a telescoped version of what contemporary Portuguese sources describe more accurately as separate incidents in 1805 and 1808-1809. See Guilain, Madagascar, pp. 200-201.

(13) Biblioteca Nacional de Lisboa, Fundo Geral, Codice 8470, n° 6, Sultão Alauí Bono Mussene Bono Omare Sultane Munhe Fane to Mendonça, [1811]. Hafkin, «Trade, Society, and Politics», pp. 211-213, identifies the writer of this letter with the first m'bilinzi Sultan of Angoche, Alawi Musheni. But in view of both Gevrey's reconstruction that Alawi ruled as Sultan of Anjouan from c. 1804-1820 and two subsequent letters from 1820 sent to Mozambique by Sultan Alawi of Anjouan, I am inclined to reject Hafkin's identification. See A. Gevrey, Essai sur les Comores (Pondichery, 1870), pp. 187, 189; A.H.U., Moç., Cx. 66, Sultao Alave Oxeny, Rey de Anjuane, to Governor-General of Mozambique, n.d., but responded to on 28 March 1820 according to a note overleaf, Sultane Alavy Bunu Usene to same, [Anjouan], 5 October 1820. Resolution of this problem awaits scholarly translation of the original letter written in Arabic script, as both Dr. Hafkin and I have necessarily worked from the contemporary Portuguese translation accompanying it. The haphazard rendering of names in these translations is manifest from the variations in the two later letters to which I have referred.
ambassador, Bwana Kombo, more concretely did the same (14). By 1815
rumour had become reality again.

In August of that year «different Moors from the Island of Madagascarg
advised the Portuguese at Mozambique «that the Sakalava had managed to
gather together there as many as forty Lacas (the name which is given to their
boats) with two thousand and more well armed men, and that they are propo-
sing to come to attack this capital and the adjacent mainland». The Governor-
General claims to have taken measures to resist their attack and advised of his
precautions they altered their plans «and after having committed sufficient
aggressions on the northern coast, fell upon the wretched Cape Delgado Is-
lands». This time, however, the Portuguese were much better prepared to deal
with the situation and instead of awaiting an attack on Ibo they met the
Sakalava in battle on 9 November 1815 while the latter were encamped on
Querimba Island (15). Nor was this the end of their troubles. According to the
victorious Governor of the Kerimba Islands, the Sakalava «were devastated in
the vicinity of Vamizi by a Moor named Bwana Hasan, Governor of Tunghui,
and although I do not know where they went from here until they reached
that island, in all the ports where they cast anchor they always suffered some
losses [sempre ião de menos]» (16).

Despite the demise of this particular expedition, most inhabitants of the
Kerimba Islands jurisdiction still lived in fear of Sakalava raiders and were
unwilling to renovate their mainland holdings. In awarding the commission of
Governor of the islands to José Antonio Caldas in 1816, the Governor-General

(14) A.H.U., Moç., Cx. 56, Mendonça to Caetano José Resende, Moç., 1
March 1812 ; A.H.U., Moç., Cx. 54 & Cod. 1478, fl. 238v, Manuel Onofre
Pantoja to Mário Caetano de Abreu e Meneses, [Ibo], 16 March 1814 ; A.H.U.,
Moç., Cx. 58, Abreu e Meneses to Antonio de Araujo de Azevedo, Moç., 29
October 1814. Bwana Kombo, who was an Arab living at Anjouan, a regular
port of call for British East Indiamen making the inner passage, has gained a
reputation as a friend of the English, who dubbed him «Bombay Jack». See
James Prior, Voyage along the East Coast of Africa .... in the Nius Frigate
(London, 1819), pp. 22, 29-30, 45-65 passim. Despite some derogatory re-
marks about the Portuguese which are recorded by Prior, Bwana Kombo was
known equally as a friend of them in 1812. See A.H.U., Moç., Cx. 56, unsigned
letter of introduction for Bombajaque, Moç., 12 [April] 1812. What this sug-
gests, of course, is that Bwana Kombo was a very effective ambassador for
Anjouan. His embassy to Mauritius in 1814 was an important step in effecting
the Anglo-Malagasy Treaty of 1817 which was designed to end the export
slave trade from Madagascar and with it the raids on the Comoro Islands. See
below, n. 31.

(15) A.H.U., Moç., Cx. 59 & Cod. 1380, fl. 157-160, Abreu e Meneses to
Azevedo, Moç., 17 December 1815 ; Santana, Documentação, II (Lisbon,
1967), p. 894. For the favourable reaction of the Portuguese Crown to the de-
fense of Ibo, see A.H.U., Moç., Cx. 59, Marquês de Aguiar to Abreu e Meneses,
Rio de Janeiro, 16 October 1816. The implied large size of the canoes used in
this expedition points to Betsimisaraka participation, since in all the major
sources large canoe construction is only explicitly reported for eastern Madag-

(16) A.H.U., Moç., Cx. 59 & Cod. 1478, fl. 242v, Antonio da Costa Portugal
to Abreu e Meneses, Ibo, 6 March 1816.
of the colony cautioned him regarding the critical circumstances which confronted him:

The inhabitants scattered about in different parts of the hinterland, seeking to abandon their homes with the panicky terror of the Sakalava, this is the principal object in which you should take care, encouraging them to return to their houses and refusing licenses which would allow them to return to this capital of Mozambique, as many intend (17).

Within a few months the fears of the inhabitants of the Kerimba Islands were amply confirmed by the largest and most fascinating expedition launched against the coast of East Africa from Madagascar.

In March 1816 word filtered down through the Swahili network from Mikindani, just south of Kilwa, that a force of 150 lakas was being readied to attack the coast at the beginning of the Southern monsoon (18). Six months later they struck. In October a Sakalava fleet of seventy-one lakas led by a Prince Sicandar of Anjouan raided Arumba Island, the first port of the islands to the south, and then sailed north to Querimba Island and ultimately to Ibo. Later in the month they engaged in a battle lasting two days with the Portuguese, who successfully resisted the attackers with few injuries. In the aftermath Governor Caldas negotiated with them in a attempt to forestall further hostilities. During the discussions he was told by Prince Sicandar that the expedition was not directed against them, but against the Shaikh of Sancul, whose town was situated immediately south of Mozambique Island, on Point Bajone. Sicandar alleged that this shaikh had captured the wife and son of a certain «Moor» and that ill winds had forced them of course. This explanation Governor-General Abreu e Meneses believed to be entirely fictitious, although it is interesting to note that a decade ago Pierre Vérin encountered living traditions of the Sakalava raids while visiting Point Bajone (19). Whatever the case may have been, the important fact for the Portuguese was the departure north of Sicandar’s fleet.

What was welcome for Ibo, however, proved to be the undoing of Vamizi and Tungui, where the Sakalava under Sicandar soon followed on the heels of a massive fleet of a reported five hundred lakas commanded by a «Moor» named Nassiri, which had already devastated Vamizi and headed up the coast towards Kilwa, Mafia, and Zanzibar (20). Here they were considerably less

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(17) A.H.U., Moç., Cx. 59, Abreu e Meneses to José Antonio Caldas, Moç., n.d., but clearly 1816.
(18) Ibid. and Cod. 1478, f1 243 & v, Costa Portugal to Abreu e Meneses, Ibo, 14 March 1816.
(20) A.H.U., Cod. 1374, fl. 96-97, Caldas to Abreu e Meneses, Ibo, 3 December 1816. According to Froherville, «Histoire», p. 198, «When the number of men assembled at the place of rendez-vous is very great, two divisions are
successful. According to a letter written from Sultan Yusuf bin Hasan of Kilwa to the Governor-General of Mozambique at this time, the Sultan informed him of having thrown the Sakalava who had been there out of Kilwa in less than three days». This defeat is confirmed both by the comment of Fortuné Albrand, who visited the island in 1819, that «Kilwa was attacked not long ago by the Sakalava. These pirates have been received vigorously and forced to re-embark with loss», and by the Ancient History of Kilwa Kisiwani (21). It is our loss that none of these sources mentions Nassiri or any other leader, but in view of everything else that we know this defeat must have been at his expense.

Sicandar's party did not leave the area around Cape Delgado until late in January 1817 and between his men and those of Nassiri much damage was done and many prisoners taken. According to the ruler of Tungui, Hasan, who now styled himself «King» since his salary from the Portuguese had been suspended, the Sakalava of Nassiri captured more than three hundred people, while those of Sicandar seized another thirty or more. Among those taken were a number of Portuguese, whom Governor Caldas charged had only themselves to blame, since they had ignored his orders to seek refuge in the fortress at Ibo (22). So while the Portuguese at Ibo had proved conclusively by 1816 that they could successfully resist the Sakalava, they remained impotent to deal with them beyond the walls of their fortress. Indeed, a series of reports

formed which direct themselves towards different points». This would seem to explain the two fleets of Sicandar and Nassiri in 1816-1817.


(22) A.H.U., Moc., Cx. 60, Caldas to Abreu e Meneses, Ibo, 29 January 1817; ibid., same to Cavalcanti de Albuquerque, Ibo, 6 July 1817, enclosing Falume Asani Falume to Caldas, Tungui, 24 May 1817; ibid., Caldas to Abreu e Meneses, Ibo, 29 January 1817, naming João Leite Pereira of Vamizi, the mother of Dona Francisca Onofre Correa of Arimba, and people who returned to the mainland settlement of Pangani after weathering the October battle at Ibo in the security of the fort. As for King Hasan, his success against the Sakalava in 1815 may have encouraged him to sever his largely nugatory ties with the Portuguese, but the ravages of 1817 caused him to seek military assistance from them. His appeal was couched both in terms of fealty and a threat to attach himself to the Sultan of Kilwa, who had been an «Umansi vassal since 1875. The Governor-General dismissed him as being completely untrustworthy. See A.H.U., Moc., Cx. 60, Cavalcanti de Albuquerque to Caldas, Moc., 26 July 1817. Tungui remained a semi-independent frontier zone between but Sa'idí Zanzibar and Portuguese Mozambique until 1887. See John Gray, History of Zanzibar from the Middle Ages to 1856 (London, 1962), pp. 175-179.
and petitions in 1817 leaves no doubt as to the miserable state of the entire Portuguese establishment in the Kerimba Islands (23).

Later in that year the Kilwa coast was again visited by a Sakalava fleet, this one consisting of only thirty-eight lakas, which earlier passed Cape Delgado without incident, although twelve took port at Vamizi. Two also touched briefly at tiny Quisiva Island, a little ways offshore from Arimba, as a result of which a Portuguese counter-offensive was launched by sea. Eight days of seeking the Sakalava in every inlet between Ibo and Arimba produced not a single laka, and by the end of November word had arrived from Tungui that the Sakalava «had been unsuccessful there» (24). For once the rumour proved to be understated. Sometime at the end of 1817 or early in 1818 the Sakalava finally met their match in the coastal waters of East Africa, when an armada of eighteen boats was dispatched from Zanzibar to avenge the capture of more than one thousand men women at Kilwa and, particularly, at Kua, Juanj, and Chole, both tiny islands in the Mafia Island cluster. After sixteen days of pursuit thirty lakas were encountered in Msimbati Bay, immediately north of the Ruvuma River mouth. One hundred of the Sakalava were armed with firearms, while the remainder possessed only spears. In port to port combat many Sakalava were killed and some injured, while the Zanzibar forces suffered only two deaths and thirty wounded. Before they were wiped out the Sakalava sued for peace and after some disagreement among themselves surrendered all of the captives and booty taken in their raiding and swore an oath never again to make war against the «Umami and Portuguese coasts of East Africa» (25).

(23) A.H.U., Moç., Cx. 60, petition of José Pereira Machado, n.d., but gamnted at Moç., 10 January 1817; ibid. & Cod. 1478, f1. 252 & v, Caldas to Cavalcanteis de Albuquerque, Ibo, 26 March 1817; A.H.U., Moç., Cx. 60, same to same, Ibo, 6 May 1817, enclosing Caldas, «Relação das Ilhas que estão no desta do de Governo», Ibo, 6 May 1817, in which only three of twenty-six are listed as populated (Matemo, Ibo, and Querimba) and seven show signs of having formerly been populated; ibid., reply, Moç., 14 June 1817.

(24) Ibid., Caldas to Cavalcanteis de Albuquerque, Ibo, 13 November 1817; ibid. & Cod. 1478, f1. 263 & v, same to same, Ibo, 1 December 1817.

(25) Biblioteca Nacional de Lisboa, Fundo Geral, Cod. 8470, f1. 71, Salimo Bono Sahi Bono SIDElde Seleman to Governor of Mozambique, Zanzibar (?), n.d. The details of this letter greatly clarify later accounts of this battle, both written and oral, but must necessarily remain provisional until the Arabic script original text receives proper scholarly translation. See Albrand, «Extrait», p. 82; W.F.W. Owen, Narrative of Voyages to Explore the shores of Africa, Arabia, and Madagascar ... (London, 1833) : I, pp. 372-373, and the use of these by Froeberville, «Historique», pp. 199-200; for oral traditions about this defeat, see Freeman-Grenville, Select Documents, pp. 224 (Kilwa) & 298 (Kua, Juanj); Kadhi Amur Omar Saadi (translated by D.W.I. Piggott), «Mafia — History and Traditions», Tanganyika Notes and Records, 12 (1941), pp. 25-27 (Kua, Juanj). The Kua traditions are extremely confused and at base represent part of a deeper attempt to account for this disaster and others by relating them to the better communal rivalry between Kua and Kisimani, Mafia.
Indeed, this was last Sakalava expedition to reach the coast of East Africa, although rumours of attack persisted and preparations continued to be made for the next two years. Some time late in 1818 Sultan Alawi of Anjouan sent his son and eventual successor, Abdallah, as ambassador to Mozambique, «to inform us that the common enemy of this coast – the Sakalava – had readied a grand armada of lakas to venture out from their port at the beginning of the southern monsoon, but that their destination was not known» (26). Strengthening of the fortifications at Ibo were proposed early in 1819 and in July a rumour had reached Mozambique that «the enemies of the State, the Sakalava», were on the coast near Moma, to the south of Angoche, although this has been earlier than all of their previous attacks on East Africa and seems doubtful in view of the wind regime. By September, however, a boat had come directly to Ibo from Mayotte «which brought the certain news that the Sakalava were not coming this year», although the Bishop of Mozambique remarked three years later that in 1819 a fleet of more than one hundred lakas with thousands of men had been almost totally annihilated by a typhoon in the Mozambique Channel (27). But it was neither respect for Portuguese military preparation or «Umani naval prowess nor fear of the natural elements which ultimately put an end to the Sakalava threat; rather it was the pressure of Merina expansion, as both Deschamps and Vérin have emphasized (28).

According to an undated letter which probably was written in the middle of 1820 by Bwana Kombo, who by then was serving as Portuguese consul at Anjouan, the Comoro Islands were at peace, although the Sakalava had gathered «many boats» to sally forth against both the islands and the African coast. But «they began to fight with each other, namely, Balambo [Amboalambo, the Sakalava name for the Merina] against Sakalava, as a result of which


(27) A.H.U., Moç., Cx. 64, Caldas to Interim Governors, Ibo, 20 February 1819; ibid., José Alves Barbosa to Caetano José Cordeiro, Moç., 8 July 1819; ibid., Cordeiro to Interim Governors, Ibo, 23 September 1819; Arquivo da Casa da Cadaval, Portugal, Cod. 826 (M VI 32), D. Fr. Bartolomeu dos Mârtires, «Memoria Chorographica da Provincia e a Capitania de Mozambique na Costa d’Africa Oriental Conforme o estado em que se achava no anno de 1822», f1. 39-42. It is possible that the Moma rumour was the result of Malagasy traders there, as Mârtires mentions that they sometimes traded directly to Mozambique. See ibid., f1. 31-32. The midchannel disaster which Mârtires reports would seem to have been that related to Thomas Boteler, who visited Mozambique in 1823, but who in his subsequent account possibly confused it with the 1816 expedition of Sicândar’s fleet of seventy – one lakas (out) of a reported 150 that were being readied earlier in the year, since he reports that of 250 boats which left Madagascar, only sixty-eight reached the Kerimba Islands. Boteler was later cited by Froiberville, who has since provided the basis for this bit of incorrect detail on the raids: Thomas Boteler, Narrative of a Voyage of Discovery to Africa and Arabia ... (London, 1835), II, p. 59; Froiberville, «Historique», p. 199.

the voyage that they wanted to make was broken up ... After the Sakalava and Balambos had fought others joined to make war against the islands and Mozambique in May or June» (29). But they, too, were diverted from this end by the apparent resumption of hostilities with the Merina. In October 1820 a letter from the Wazir (Governor) of Bombetoka [i.e. Majunga] informed the Portuguese that «there is a war between twelve [possibly a misreading for two ?] chiefs and the Sakalava, who find themselves roundly defeated and without forces; and in this matter you and the other lands can rest at ease that they are free from the Sakalava» (30). The final note regarding the demise of the Sakalava raiders so far as the Portuguese were concerned came two years later, when the Bishop of Mozambique noted briefly that they had been defeated at home by their neighbours and the British (31).

From a Mozambican perspective all that really mattered was the certain end to the raids from Madagascar. It remains, however, to sort out more precisely what factors might have been at play in motivating, sustaining, and ending the expeditions. For this task I am more dependant upon secondary sources and my own less certain knowledge of Malagasy history, but let us go back over these same events and see what possibilities emerge.

First, what motivated the raids? Both Kent and Vérin unequivocally state that the principal reason for the raids was to acquire slaves. Each emphasizes the Sakalava demand for both slave labour and slaves for trade, and the inability of the Sakalava to obtain them internally by the end of the eighteenth century, while Vérin places rather more emphasis on the role of the Betsimisaraka and the Antalaoite and thereby on the external slave trade (32). It is also clear that although the raids on the Comoro Islands were initial-

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(29) Santana, Documentação, III, pp. 349-350. Bwana Kombo and his brother, Omar Abubakr, visited Mozambique at the beginning of 1820; by the end of the year both had idea, Bwana Kombo’s brother having first succeeded him as consul at Anjouan after his death. See A.H.U., Moç., Cx. 86, Sultão Aláve Ozeny, Rey de Anjoane, to Governor-General of Mozambique, n.d., but responded to on 28 Mars 1820 in a letter carried by Prince Mwenye Mwe- ri Sidi Ali; A.H.U., Moç., Cx. 67, João da Costa de Brito Sanches to Arcos, Moç., 22 December 1820, including a reference to a royal order of 29 June 1819 which seems to have established the appointment of these Arab consuls. For the identification of the Balambos as Merina, see Vérin, «Histoire ancienne», p. 166, n. 1.

(30) A.H.U., Moç., Cx. 67, Brito Sanches to Arcos, Moç., 23 November 1820, enclosing «Copia da Tradução de huma Carta enviada pelo vizir de São Lourenço, Bona ussene Bone Abdulà», 18 October 1820. This is the same Antalaoite governor of Majunga who was executed on 22 July 1824 after the town fell to the army of Radama I. His letter would seem to throw a different light on received accounts of Radama’s 1820 campaign against the Sakalava. See Vérin, «Histoire ancienne», pp. 166-167.

(31) Cadaval Cod. 826 (M VI 32), f1. 39-42. For the significance the Anglo-Malagasy alliance in repressing the maritime expeditions, see Deschamps Histoire, pp. 153-159.

ly and principally organized by the Zara-Malata led Betsimisaraka, they were referred to exclusively in East Africa as Sakalava raids. To my knowledge the only contemporary observer who made this distinction was the astute British ambassador to the kingdom of Ethiopia, Henry Salt:

This foe consisted of a nation of pirates on the north-east point of Madagascar, called by the Portuguese Sekelaves, but whose real name I have reason to believe is Marati* [i.e. Zana-Malata], which for many years back has been known to infest the Comoro Islands.

* This I learned from the Arabian traders. The Sekelaves, I was informed by Captain Fisher and others who visited that part of the island, are subjects of the Queen of Pembotec, residing on the north-western side of Madagascar (33).

This peculiarity of nomenclature does not mean that no Betsimisaraka ever participated in the raids on East Africa, but it does suggest strongly that the less numerous Sakalava component of the larger expeditions against the Comoros—a point which is made explicitly by Epidariste Colin at the beginning of the nineteenth century and is repeated by Froeberville—was generally responsible for those launched across the Mozambique Channel (34). If this is a correct deduction, why should it have been so?

Quite apart from geography, which I do not consider a factor here, since all of the raiders departed from the far northwest coast, whichever side of the island they called home, I believe that the key to understanding may lie in the complex Muslim economic network that linked the entire East African littoral and its offshore islands. Véron has already pointed the way towards this conclusion, but I think that the Portuguese documentation adds considerable weight to what he has already written (35). The earliest possible implication of Muslim (variously Arab, Swahili, Antalaotse, or «Moor») complicity in the raids is suggested by the ambiguous details of the small 1800 attack on Arimba, which I have already indicated might have involved the Sultan of Mayotte. Perhaps, too, the especially harsh treatment received by Tungui in the great raid of 1808-1809 may point in this direction. By the 1820s, however, a theory had emerged that specifically pointed to people of Bombetoka Bay, both Antalaotse and Sakalava, as the driving force behind the raids on East Africa. How did this interpretation take shape?

(33) Salt, Voyage, p. 76. Fischer was Captain of the Racehorse, which took Salt to Mozambique from the Cape.

(34) Véron, «Histoire ancienne», pp. 155-160; Also A. Monteiro, «Pesquisas arqueológicas nos estabelecimentos de Kiuya, M'buezi e Quisiva», Monumenta, II (1966), pp. 51-56, who describes several Sakalava tombs at the mouth of the Ruuma River; but cf. C.S. Nicholls, The Swahili Coast (London, 1971), p. 130, though the two published of her three sources do not mention the Betsimisaraka. Colin is cited by Gevrey, Essai, pp. 210-211, from Malte-Brun, Annales des Voyages, de la Géographie et de l'histoire, XIII, but I have not yet been able to check the original text; Froeberville, «Historique», p. 197, uses the same passage, but without citation, though the mistake may be Gevrey's.

In 1845 Guillain correctly observed that the maritime raids began during the reign of the Sakalava Queen of Boina, Ravahiny (c. 1770-1808). «They were not, it is true», Guillain adds, «ordered by her; but her subjects took part in them» (36). Furthermore, Fressanges, who is cited by Guillain, noted at the beginning of the nineteenth century that Mozambique slaves reaching the east coast of Madagascar were transshipped by Arab chelingues (small boats of about twenty to twenty-five tons burden) from the Muslim trading town of Mosangai in Bombetoka Bay, and the commercial prosperity of that place is attributed by many subsequent writers to Ravahiny’s patronage of the Antalaoise (37). But it does not follow that either she or the Muslim merchants of her kingdom were involved in the raids. Quite the contrary. In 1805 the Queen of Bombetoka — clearly Ravahiny — warned the Governor-General of Mozambique that a fleet of six hundred Sakalava boats «called chalingas» were preparing to raid the Kerimba Islands, information which together with the loss of the Boa Mâe and a direct appeal for aid from the Sultan of Anjouan led to the dispatching of the ill-fated Emboscada in 1806. It would be interesting to know if there were really Muslim vessels incorporated into this fleet, but this nautical reference is unique in the Portuguese documentation (38).

Only in 1812, after the death of Ravahiny and the subsequent fragmentation and decline of Sakalava, especially Boina, power in western Madagascar does Bombetoka Bay directly, and apparently incorrectly, become identified as a center for raids on the coast of East Africa. In that year both the captain and the surgeon of H.M.S. Niuss, which sailed from the Cape of Good Hope to Mozambique and Anjouan in response to request for assistance from both the Portuguese and the Sultan of Anjouan, gathered information on the organization of the raids on East Africa (39). Captain Beaver was told after some hesitation by the Governor-General of Mozambique «that the Malagassi generally come over every year [which was not true], to the no. of four or five thousand men, in about a hundred canoes; that they always assembled at Bombatouk, whence they stood with a leading breeze, over to Mayotte», and


(37) Fressanges is quoted most accessibly by Véron, «Histoire ancienne», pp. 151-152; for chelingues, see Albrand, «Extrait», p. 75. For a contemporary commercial guide to trade at Bombetoka Bay, see William Milburn, Oriental Commerce (London, 1813), I, p. 72, citing a source dated to 1802.

(38) A.H.U., Cod. 1372, f1. 7v, Sousa a Sà to Anadia, Moç., 9 July 1805. In general, boat size is not mentioned in the East African sources on the raids, though the two oral versions of the history of Kua, Juani, specify that the Sakalava lakas were small, a point of detail which conflicts sharply with the letter from Zanzibar that describes the battle in Maimbati Bay; see Freeman-Grenville, Select Documents, p. 298; Kadhi Amur, «Mafia», p. 25.

thence to their ultimate destination for that year. Surgeon Prior, for his part,
generally confirms this source but adds to it the important qualifying testi-
mony of a French ship's captain who was at Mozambique in August 1812
during the visit of the Niṣus and who told Prior that in one of his seventeen
voyages to Madagascar, «while near Bombateke [my emphasis], he saw nearly
the whole surface of the bay covered by canoes, and more than 40,000 people,
men, women, and children, assembled preparatory to an expedition. Ten years
later Boteler was led to believe that the Arabs of Bombetoka incited the Mal-
gasy to make these raids (40).

This seems patently incorrect. The persistence of friendly commercial
relations between Mozambique and the Muslim traders of Bombetoka Bay
argues against any officially sanctioned participation in raids, actual or con-
templated, at least during the lifetime of Queen Ravahiny of Boina. In 1804 Colin
described an Arab controlled trade in slaves from Mozambique in exchange
for rice from Bombetoka [i.e. Mosangae]. A year later a «Moc» is reported
to have carried a cargo of slaves from Macaloe Island, which at that time was
still inhabited, to Madagascar, although two years later an unidentified boat
from there was refused permission to trade at Ibo (41). The ransoming
of Portuguese subjects of the Kerimba Islands at Madagascar in 1810, however,
indicates positively that good relations were maintained with Bombetoka
throughout these years, and the presence there of a Grand Comoro prince who
was friendly to the Portuguese seems unlikely if it were at all deeply involved
in the raids (see above, pp. 34). Finally, there is a tantalizing entry in the offi-
cial port log book of Mozambique at the beginning of 1811 which lists appro-
val of a license for «Massane Bunu carrier from the Queen Vaine [Ravahiny]
of Bom-Bottoque», to buy forty slaves (42).

This official Portuguese recognition of the Muslim slave trade to Maga-
dascar, a business which flourished illicitly to the very end of the nineteenth

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(40) W.H. Smythe, The Life and Service of Captain Philip Beaver, late of Her
Majesty Ship Niṣus (London, 1829), p. 256; Prior, Voyage, pp. 63-64; Bote-
ler, Narrative, II, p. 59.

(41) Epidariste Colin, «Notice sur Mozambique», in Malte-Brun, Annales,
IX (Paris, 1809), p. 315; A.H.U., Moç., Cx. 46, Rodrigo Berri to Sousa e Sá,
[1805]; A.H.U., Moç., Cx. 50, Caetano José Resende to Melo Castro e Men-
donça, Ibo, 27 October 1807. Macaloe is north of Ibo, just offshore from Pan-
gani.

(42) A.H.U., Cod. 1379, fl. 66, registro de despacho, 8 January 1811. It could
well be that traders from Bombetoka continued to identify themselves to Eu-
ropes as being under the protection of Ravahiny for years after her death
because of her great prestige, but if this brief and casual notation is correct,
then we are faced with a reassessment of her date of death, a point of detail
which can only be resolved by those whose knowledge of Sakaia history is
more profound than mine. The continued eminence of the «Queen of Bom-
betoka» may also account for a reference to her success in war in 1820, by
which date she was certainly dead and her grandson, Andriamanesiario,
reigned. cf. The explanation given by Vérin, Histoire ancienne, p. 166, for
this anomaly.
century after Portuguese legal abolition in 1836, suggests additionally that neither the political nor the commercial masters of Boina were at all inclined to undercut a mutually profitable relationship with Mozambique by participating in a series of short-lived piratical ventures. Perhaps it is worth pursuing the possibility that the main Sakalava component of the raids on East Africa was composed of the so-called «petits Saclaves», including the Antankara and Tsimihiety who were ruled by Sakalava Volafoatay princes. They were better rivals of the Sakalava kingdom of Boina during this period and might possibly have looked upon these expeditions as an extension of their commercial harassment of Boina trade to the east coast along the Sofia River valley (43).

With the raid of 1816-1817 the complexity of the issue deepens. First, there is the clear identification of the leaders of both Sakalava fleets, Sicandar and Nassiri, as Muslims. According to Guinet, in about 1860 he was informed by a Malagasy from the north of the island that «it was generally an Antalaostra who took general direction of the entire flotilla ...». This was apparently done because of their superior navigational ability, but the Portuguese documentation suggests a much stronger Muslim leadership role for at least some of these expeditions (44). Second, there is the tale about the real object of Sicandar’s expedition being to settle a score with the Shaikh of Sancul and the tradition noted by Véerin in that same area expressing fear of the Sakalava. Third, there is the garbled and clearly mythic tradition recorded by Freeman-Grenville at Kua, Juani, which links a vengeful Muslim builder, the Sakalava, and Ibo together in explaining the great raid on that settlement in 1816.

To be sure, none of this is more than suggestive, but it speaks to a highly mobile system in which there was plenty of room for personal grievances to emerge and perhaps to be settled by violence. It also implies a system in which could support both an officially sanctioned trade that tolerated (in the case of Boina) and sometimes required (in the case of Anjouan) formal relations with Europeans in order to maintain a command of specific niches within that system (45). By the same token, ambitious individuals who were excluded from formal authority within such a system could always be moved to seize by force

(43) For the Muslim slave trade to Madagascar from Mozambique see Haftin, «Trade, Society, and Politics», passim; for the Antankara and Tsimihiety, see Deschamps, Histoire, pp. 101-102. In the middle of the eighteenth century a marriage alliance was made between the Zana-Malata founder of the Betsimisaraka kingdom, Ratsimilaho or Ramaromanompo, and the kingdom of Boina. What the ramifications of this alliance between the Zana-Malata and the Vola-mena dynasty might have been during the era of the maritime raids is a question that remains to be examined. See ibid., p. 106.


(45) In this context it is worth noting «the important services made to this State [of Mozambique] on the occasions of the Sakalava when they twice sought to invade the Island of Ibo ... with his person and people, offering his powder, shot, and foodstuffs», claimed by an Arab trader from Anjouan. See
what they could not otherwise claim legitimately in peace. Indeed, a hint of just that also exists in a casual paraphrasing of oral tradition about the raids existing in the Comoro Islands in the 1930s:

People say that the invaders were Be’aimisaraka and that they pushed their expeditions up to the East African coast, to Kisimani Mafia and to Ibo and that they were piloted by some people from the Comoros, Zanzibar and the coast of Africa, who would only have been common law prisoners driven out from their country (46).

Finally, if the characteristic division of Swahili communities into competing moieties holds true also for those of the Comoro Islands and northwestern Madagascar, then this sort of conflict would have been normal (47).

The political history of both Anjouan and Mayotte at this time bears witness to this process. Here were two small, weak, and ravaged polities which could barely withstand the continual assaults launched against them from Madagascar. Successive sultans of Anjouan had solicited European assistance and protection, but none succeeded before the usurper Alawi, who after failing to overthrow his infant nephew, Ahmad, in about 1797, fled to Zanzibar before returning after 1804 to dethrone him for good (48). Perhaps Sicandar was a disgruntled scion of Ahmad’s house who sought retribution against Alawi by attacking his Portuguese and Swahili allies? It seems an idea worth exploring, particularly in the collection of oral traditions. As for Mayotte, its history is rife with dethronings and political assassinations in the eighteenth and early decades of the nineteenth century, which at the very least provides a possible context for the pursuit of a rival on the East African coast in 1800. Possibilities such as these seem all the more attractive when we consider the elaborate connections between the seizure of Mayotte in 1832 by the deposed Boina king, Andriantsoly — the Islamized grandson of Ravahiny who by the early 1820s had linked his fortunes more intimately with the Antalaoites than with

A.H.U., Moç., Cx. 66, petition pf Saide Honar Bonu Cheane, n.d., but received at Moç., 16 December 1820. The petition identifies himself as being of the «Casta Mujojo» which at this time could mean any coastal Muslim or Comorien, but his letter was handled at Mozambique by the «Consul de Nação Arabe», and the Anjouan consul.


(48) For early Anjouan appeals, see Gevrey, Essai, p. 187, & Vérin, «Histoire ancienne», pp. 158-159; for Alawi’s history, see Gevrey, Essai, pp. 187, 189. The earliest general Comorien appeal to the Portuguese for assistance «against the continual invasions of the Sakalava pirates», an interesting choice of words considering the origins of the Zana-Malata, came from Mohilla : A.H.U., Moç., Cx. 26, O Principe dos Muîates (with untranslated Arabic signature) to Senhores, n.d. [in a folder marked 1789].

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his non-Muslim Sakalava subjects — and the pre-existing rivalries which plagued its politics (49).

If resolution of the research questions raised by this paper is to be effected it will involve further investigation of both archival and oral sources. There may well be further sources to be found in the French archives of the period, including those housed in Mauritius, Réunion, and Madagascar. It seems likely, too, that additional British sources exist in the British Museum and the India Office Library, although many of these repositories have been carefully searched by scholars such as Jean Valette. Not have the Mozambican archives ever been examined with this topic in mind. The same may be true of the Comorian archives, although here I am less certain. In particular it is vitally important that we obtain accurate, scholarly translations of the various Swahili, Arabic, and Malagasy documents in Arabic script that are known to exist in the Portuguese archives, as well as those available in public or private hands in Madagascar, the Comoro Islands, and Mozambique. Finally, we need to follow up the leads of Guinet in 1860, Fontoymont and Raomandahy in the 1930s, and Véron a decade ago and pursue these questions in the field. For present evidence, so far as East Africa is concerned, the Sakalava raids may have been rooted more immediately in the political and economic rivalries of the Muslim trading network linking Madagascar to the continent than in the wider setting of the slave trade of the western Indian Ocean.

(49) For details, see Noel, «Recherches», pp. 41-55. No less riddled with internecine struggles during the nineteenth century is the history of Grand Comoro Island, for which see Fontoymont & Raomandahy, «La Grande Comore», pp. 25-29. For Andriantsoly’s history, see Deschamps, Histoire, pp. 159-160, 170-171; Véron, «Histoire ancienne», pp. 167-168. He also appears in the Portuguese documentation, before his final defeat by Ranavalona I, when he was still based at Ancorontsangana: Santana, Documentação, III, pp. 166-167.